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ABSTRACT
Assurance techniques generate evidence that allow us to
make claims of assurance about security. For the purpose of
certification to an assurance scheme, this evidence enables
us to answer the question: are the implemented security
controls consistent with organisational risk posture? This
paper uses interviews with security practitioners to assess
how ICS security assessments are conducted in practice, be-
fore introducing the five “PASIV” principles to ensure the
safe use of assurance techniques. PASIV is then applied to
three phases of the system development life cycle (develop-
ment; procurement; operational), to determine when and
when not, these assurance techniques can be used to gener-
ate evidence. Focusing then on the operational phase, this
study assesses how assurances techniques generate evidence
for the 35 security control families of ISO/IEC 27001:2013.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.6.5 [Computing Milieux]: Management of Computing
and Information Systems—Security and Protection
General Terms
Security, Evaluation, Performance, Standards
Keywords
ICS, SCADA, Risk Management, Assurance Techniques
1. INTRODUCTION
Industrial Control System (ICS) security has seen a deluge
of research activity over the past decade. Much work has
been conducted in the field of risk management; in particu-
lar the development of new methodologies. However, mini-
mal attention has been paid to the techniques used within
these processes, which are used to generate evidence to make
claims of assurance. This paper examines these “assurance
techniques” within the context of ICSs.
Critical infrastructure such as that of utility industries (e.g.,
oil and gas) is a frequently cited example of an ICSs, al-
though their usage is far more diverse and widespread. Ser-
vice industries (e.g., logistics), and manufacturing industries
(e.g., aerospace) make heavy use of ICS technologies. The
technologies that support ICSs are largely similar in con-
cept, and in many cases, identical. The technological sim-
ilarity can be further expanded to small-scale installations,
such as Building Automation Systems, although they are
not addressed here.
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Figure 1: A Conceptual Model of an ICS: Safety and Secu-
rity Goals (Adapted from [3, 8])
At a conceptual level, an ICS can be seen as a series of lay-
ers, split into two areas (Figure 1). Layers 0-3 constitute
the “Operational Technology (OT) environment”. Present
in layers 0-2 are safety systems, the sensors and actuators
that monitor and manipulate physical processes, and the de-
vices enforcing the intended logic of such processes. Multiple
instances of layers 0-2 may exist, which may be geographi-
cally clustered or dispersed (e.g., a utility network may have
many thousand “field sites”). In both cases, they have been
conceptually labelled ”Cell Zones”. Layer 3 manages OT
environment wide functions. Layer 3 systems capture and
archive cell zone process data, monitor these processes, and
take managerial action as necessary. Layers 4-5 are known as
the “IT Environment” where enterprise functions are tradi-
tionally found. Centralised IT services are found here (e.g.,
business-to-customer services). Both the OT and IT en-
vironments may be physically isolated from each other, in
what is known as an “air gap” which can act as a secu-
rity feature. However, these networks in contemporary ICSs
are frequently interconnected, due to the potential to fa-
cilitate core business functions (e.g., to enable automation
in a manufacturing system, through linking the consumer
purchasing system to the production line). The terms OT
and ICS are frequently used synonymously; however, here
ICS refers more holistically to all layers of the conceptual
model to account for components and processes that span
this boundary (often in both directions).
It is through the diversity in the operational requirements
of ICSs that challenges in the appropriate and effective use
of assurance techniques can be seen to emerge. Yet it is
these techniques that allow us to generate claims of assur-
ance about security. This paper addresses their application
within ICSs, and makes the following key contributions:
1. Examining “how” security assessments are conducted
within ICS environments and establishing guiding prin-
ciples (PASIV) for safe and effective assurance tech-
nique use.
2. Assessing “when” assurance techniques can be used at
different phases of the System Development Life Cycle
(SDLC).
3. Assessing “where” these assurance techniques provide
evidence of (non-)conformity about security control
implementation within ISO/IEC 27001:2013.
Assurance techniques and related concepts are introduced in
Section 2, along with existing literature in this domain. A
methodology is outlined in Section 3. Section 4 then focuses
on the use of assurance techniques within ICS environments.
Section 4.1 examines current approaches to security assess-
ments and derives five principles for using assurance tech-
niques. Assurance technique use within three phases of the
ICS SDLC are examined in Section 4.2, while Section 4.3
examines their contribution to ISO/IEC 27001:2013.
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
Assurance techniques are merely activities with particular
characteristics. The appropriate time of their use, their ef-
fectiveness, and the implications surrounding their outputs
form part of the wider ecosystem of assurance. Previous
work established terminology to describe the major concepts
within this ecosystem [14]. Each component is described be-
low, and their relationships collectively illustrated in Figure
2.
Assurance Scheme - This encompasses formal publica-
tions for organisations (e.g., standards) and individual qual-
ifications, which establish a “level” of assurance that is to
be met. For both, at least one assurance target is set. In
some assurance schemes, there are explicitly defined assur-
ance techniques that should be used to assess targets. For
others, these are set and enforced through an external body
(e.g., an accreditation body).
Assurance Target - An assurance target may be either
a security control (e.g., asset management) or the compe-
tence requirements to assess such security controls (e.g., an
individual must possess a certain qualification).
Assurance Technique - A method of assessing an assur-
ance target. There are two types of assurance techniques.
Those which assess security controls (e.g., penetration test-
ing) and those that assess the competence requirements for
using those assurance techniques (e.g., a multiple choice or
lab-based exam). In some assurance schemes, the use of
particular assurance techniques is explicitly defined.
Audit and Assessment Evidence - The use of an assur-
ance technique to assess an assurance target generates audit
or assessment evidence. Such evidence is used to assess con-
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Figure 2: The Terminology of Assurance
All components of the ecosystem are not mandatory in the
assurance process. An absence of an assurance scheme is a
conspicuous example of where this may occur. Assurance
techniques may assess the security controls of a product and
generate assessment evidence, which is not used as audit evi-
dence within an assurance scheme. Instead, this contributes
to the “perception” of assurance and associated risk. An as-
surance scheme is then an established baseline for the level
of perceived assurance. This paper, however, focuses on sce-
narios where all components are present, to understand how
assurance techniques can be used within security evaluation
criteria for future assurance schemes for ICS.
The extent of the implications of audit evidence (positive
or negative) is dependent upon the assurance scheme. For
example, in what is best seen as a spectrum, at one end,
in some assurance schemes a “high risk” vulnerability dis-
covered through penetration testing may be indicative of a
major non-conformity. At the other end, this may not be
the case. Instead, an holistic review of organisational risk
posture is considered. ISO/IEC 27001 is an example of a
risk-based assurance scheme, which in ISO terminology is
termed a Management System Standard (MSS) 1. A com-
mon misperception of such assurance schemes is that they
establish strict requirements for security controls. However,
1ISO/IEC 27001 has been adapted for ICS environments in
the energy sector through ISO/IEC 27019.
in practice system owners opt-in or opt-out of broadly de-
fined security controls based on their chosen risk posture
2. The security controls themselves are not mandatory; the
clauses which mandate the supporting processes for mak-
ing such decisions are. An auditor’s role is not to dictate
personal perceptions of what security should look like; it is
to verify that the client has, amongst other requirements,
clearly established processes for risk assessment (a process
which itself may use assurance techniques as inputs), risk
treatment (i.e., the modification of risk if required, for ex-
ample, through implementing additional security controls),
and risk acceptance (i.e., an informed decision to accept re-
tained risk) in an ongoing fashion. A system owner will
implement security controls based upon this process (reduc-
ing the broad category down to a specific type and extent of
implementation). Audit evidence can then be used to verify
that the processes are established and that the security con-
trols that have been implemented are consistent with this



















Figure 3: Audit Evidence Determines Conformity Based on
Organisational Risk Posture
Such assurance schemes have the core feature of account-
ing for the particulars of organisational context when deter-
mining conformity. This has notable benefits for ICS en-
vironments. There exists industry-wide and system-specific
operational challenges which create risk generating scenar-
ios. For example, inadequate security considerations dur-
ing product development may create insecure components,
and depending upon ongoing vendor support, patches may
not be available within reasonable time scales (or at all).
Even with patch availability there remains the challenge of
patch management for high-availability safety-critical sys-
tems. This approach to assurance schemes allows such risk
inducing scenarios to occur, and does not deal a deadly blow
to the certification of an organisation’s efforts to provide as-
surance. However, it does this on one provision: a robust
risk management process is in place to assess, treat, and ac-
cept risks. Therefore, although audit evidence generated by
a particular assurance technique may indicate risk, an au-
ditor can use other assurance techniques to verify that risk
treatment has occurred, and that what remains, is consis-
tent with the system owner’s risk posture. In practice, such
a risk treatment process may involve a defence-in-depth ap-
proach through the implementation of mitigating security
controls. These controls may be technical (e.g., monitor-
ing systems), non-technical (e.g., additional administrative
controls for the use of vulnerable systems), or both (e.g.,
2This is known as the Statement of Applicability (SoA).
risk-based segmentation, such as with IEC-62443’s Zones
and Conduits model).
The dynamic of technical and non-technical security controls
arguably mandates the use of technical and non-technical
assurance techniques in their assessment. In practice, how-
ever, audits rely heavily on non-technical assurance tech-
niques [14]. Multiple reasons for this exist. Notably, due
to the process-focus of many assurance schemes, but also
because it is unrealistic to expect auditors to also have the
skill sets required for highly technical assurance techniques.
What is reasonable, however, is the expectation for system
owner or third party security assessments to contribute as
audit evidence. A report by the British Standards Institu-
tion (BSI) [7] has highlighted the need for this to occur with
greater frequency within security-based assurance schemes,
and made recommendations for additional standardisation
in the form of auditing guidelines for the use of simulated
security assessments (e.g., penetration tests) as audit evi-
dence. The intention being that such assurances techniques
generate demonstrable audit evidence of whether security
controls are consistent with risk posture.
Through the conceptualisation of the components of assur-
ance, one can see how assurance techniques are a fundamen-
tal tool of the assurance process. Despite this, they have
largely escaped the focus of existing research. A significant
body of literature exists on assurance schemes, both within
and outside ICS security; however, the focus has predomi-
nantly fallen on the operational challenges and benefits of
using such schemes and not the assurance techniques con-
tained (explicitly or implicitly).
Where existing literature exists on assurance techniques, the
focus has largely fallen on their role within software as-
surance. In particular, assurance techniques and their use
within the software development life cycle [2]), or in rare
cases, their use within specific product-focused assurance
schemes (e.g., the classification of assurance techniques for
use within Common Criteria [6]). The predominant body of
work in this area has been instigated by the National Insti-
tute of Standards and Technology (NIST) project, Software
Assurance Metrics And Tool Evaluation (SAMATE)3, which
is sponsored by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(DHS). An abundance of publications have been produced
under this umbrella; notably around the topic of source code
analysis, with a particular focus on static analysis4. A com-
prehensive review of existing software security assessment
tools is presented in [18], focusing on when they can be used,
their required skills, and their benefits and drawbacks.
To the authors’ knowledge there is no existing academic lit-
erature examining the use of assurance techniques within
ICS environments. There is, however, ad-hoc industry-led
literature on specific assurance techniques. The UK Centre
for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) have
produced a procurement guide for ICS penetration testing
[1]. One section of this report highlights high-level risks and
potential mitigations. A more detailed report on the prac-
tical assessment was produced by CPNI in partnership with
3http://samate.nist.gov/Main_Page.html
4A list of SAMATE publications can be found at: http://
samate.nist.gov/index.php/SAMATE_Publications.html
the U.S. DHS [17]. Engagement design is the core focus, and
consideration, at a high-level, is provided on potential risks.
At the time of submission, this report had just entered a
period of review. A more detailed ICS assessment method-
ology is outlined in NESCOR [13], which categorises attack
types by systems affected (but not at the level of assurance
techniques) and the level of relative expertise required to
assess each. In each publication, the risks of assessments
are raised, but not discussed in depth, and no principles to
underpin assurance technique use have been defined. Fur-
thermore, such guidance is placed under the umbrella of
“penetration test” or “security assessment”, and there is no
consideration of wider assurance technique use within the
SDLC, or their contribution within assurance schemes.
3. METHODOLOGY
This study was conducted as a special use case within a
wider project around the economics of assurance activities
[14]. As part of this process, a period of desk research es-
tablished the components of the assurance ecosystem, along
with contextualising the fundamental role of 20 assurance
techniques in IT systems. Assurance technique definitions
can be found in Appendix A.
After the process mentioned above, a series of interviews
was conducted to establish context on real-world security
risk management practices of ICS operators (the framework
in which assurance techniques provide value), and the ap-
proaches and challenges to conducting ICS security assess-
ments. The latter is the focus of this paper, although the
former influenced this study’s design along with related liter-
ature in this domain (e.g., see Knowles et al. [8] for a recent
survey). To maximise the contribution of interviews, four
non-operator security practitioners were targeted. A benefit
of this approach is that these are the individuals conducting
security assessments within ICS environments in a consul-
tancy (or quasi-consultancy) role. However, a secondary
benefit is that these individuals have experience within a
multitude of operator environments (one stakeholder stated
this figure was over 100). Interview questions are outlined
in Appendix B.
A grounded theory approach was utilised in the analysis of
interview data. Approaches to current security assessments
were analysed, and recurring themes in cautionary warn-
ings and practices led to the derivation of a set of principles
for conducting security assessments — i.e., “how” to con-
duct assurance techniques within ICS. The principles along
with descriptions of practitioner experiences were then used
to analyse “when” assurance techniques can be used within
three phases of the SDLC. A separate analysis was then
conducted for operational systems to determine “where” as-
surance techniques generate evidence within an assurance
scheme (with respect to security controls). Both the choice
of phases and assurance scheme were influenced by the risk
management findings.
4. ASSURANCE TECHNIQUES FOR ICS
Understanding the potential opportunities for assurance tech-
nique use has significance, as it is through these techniques
that the concept of risk is sculpted and opportunities for
claims of assurance to be made. This section examines the
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Figure 4: Study Methodology
of principles is presented based upon the findings of practi-
tioner interviews. These principles are then applied to the
assurance techniques defined within this study to examine
their use within three phases of the ICS SDLC and their
contribution as audit evidence within ISO/IEC 27001:2013.
4.1 Approaches to ICS Security Assessments
To what extent are ICS operators conducting security as-
sessments? Results of a 2013 ENISA survey [5] show high
variation: only ∼15% are ”always” testing, 30-35% ”often”
and 60% ”sometimes”. A 2014 SANS survey [12] has sim-
ilar findings, but refers to how many operators use broad
techniques, and does not quantify their frequency. Neither
study considers non-response bias; therefore, caution should
be taken in extrapolating results.
More interesting, perhaps, is who is conducting these se-
curity assessments when there is third party involvement.
Practitioners interviewed within this study described heavy
involvement of governments, primarily for critical infrastruc-
ture, which may come as no surprise; however, private sector
involvement varied highly. For example, within the UK con-
text, security assessments are predominantly government-
led for critical infrastructure, either by CESG (the infor-
mation security arm of GCHQ) or government departments
(in some cases, facilitated with CESG involvement). Com-
mercial assessments of ICSs in the UK were described as
significantly less prominent than in other countries; notably
the US. As the UK ICS security industry matures, com-
mercial involvement may increase, as it has the secondary
benefit of reducing the burden on government assessments.
Indeed, the UK government has initiated schemes for such a
reason in the past: notably“IT Health Checks”5 for penetra-
5http://www.cesg.gov.uk/servicecatalogue/service_
tion tests of public sector systems. Furthermore, CREST6,
the leading UK body for penetration testing, is currently
seeking to expand its STAR scheme, which provides threat
intelligence-led red team exercises for critical infrastructure.
Such reasoning may be applied to explain the extensive com-
mercial sector involvement within the US, as one considers
the logistical challenges of delivering security assessments
across the US’ extensive geographical scale.
Practitioners were asked about their experiences of what
types of assurance techniques are used within ICS security
assessments. The perception was that for security assess-
ments of ICS environments, there was one of two approaches
(Figure 5), which may be considered technical and non-
technical (in relative terms, referring to their form of valida-
tion, rather than the individual competence of their users).
Most widespread were security assessments that were in ef-
fect risk assessments that used the non-technical “big three”
audit techniques: Review of Documented Policies, Proce-
dures, and Processes; Observe; Interview. In-house techni-
cal security assessments were rare, as many ICS operators
do not yet have appropriately trained individuals to con-
duct these tasks. Third party commercial (technical) se-
curity assessments, widely marketed as penetration tests,
were increasing for the critical infrastructure sectors, but
infrequent, and highly rare for non-critical environments.
For IT networks, the frequency of security assessments was
deemed to parallel those of non-ICS systems, although OT
components within the IT network would often be out of
scope. It was the general consensus of practitioners that cur-
rent modes of assessing such environments were limited and
greater effort should be placed on ensuring security controls
are not only in place, but are effective in their objectives.
Practitioners felt the service model for commercial security
assessments of OT environments was largely consistent: a
fully white box engagement (i.e., full system awareness by
the attacker) in collaboration with the ICS operator (e.g., to
prevent operational impacts). In essence, the approach was
one of a traditional security consultancy approach, rather
than the scenario-based penetration testing model that they
were marketed as. However, these services do contain a de-
gree of the “penetration” element, but theorised rather than
practically demonstrated. Commercial security assessment
providers described methodologies for assessing the opera-
tional OT environments. Such assessments unsurprisingly
shied away from the active and found passive alternatives
to what would be conducted in a typical IT engagement.
Highly cited assurance techniques included configuration re-
views, architecture reviews (including passive network mon-
itoring and mapping), physical inspections, and threat as-
sessments. Supplementary test-bed assessments were sought
to allow for greater active assessment, but few ICS operators
were found to have this capability (either owned or shared
with other operators), and many were not representative of
operational networks. Other forms of simulated security as-
sessments (e.g., red team exercises and social engineering
audits) were not considered to be widely conducted, due to
a limited appetite from procuring operators. However, prac-































Figure 5: Two Approaches to Security Assessments
Third party involvement in the assessment of security dur-
ing procurement was rare, although one practitioner stated
its popularity is slowly increasing, and that they encourage
ICS operators to include security testing clauses within their
procurement contracts. For example, to state that if a de-
vice fails a security assessment, a discount is received, or
there are other contractual requirements for patches within
an established time frame.
For operational ICS environments, the lack of security as-
sessments was suggested to lie with the lack of risk man-
agement processes or business requirement for such tests. A
technical assessment would create a de-facto obligation to
address issues found. Security assessments exist to push or-
ganisations to a higher level of security. Vulnerabilities in
assessments of any infrastructure are frequently found; ICS
are no exception, and arguably present greater opportunity
for vulnerability (e.g., due to legacy equipment). A secu-
rity assessment in effect is the purchasing of a problem. For
operators that have invested heavily in security risk man-
agement there is a benefit of such an assessment; however,
without the basic organisational competency for assessing
and managing security risk, any issues found will be chal-
lenging to address, which may act as a deterrent. The dom-
inance of the “audit-approach” was seen to encourage risk
management behaviours.
A recurring theme in practitioner opinions was that the
paradigm of ICS security assessments differs considerably
from its IT counterpart. For some practitioners, the lack of
a skilled workforce with an understanding of the peculiari-
ties of assessing such environments posed a risk as security
assessment providing organisations increasingly target the
growing ICS security market. The fear being that the lack
of domain-specific knowledge could lead to undesirable con-
sequences for operators and potentially wider stakeholders.
Based upon the findings of practitioner interviews, five prin-
ciples were derived for ICS security assessments of opera-
tional environments: PASIV. Here, PASIV is a homophone
for passive, the guiding principle of assurance techniques use
within ICS environments.
Proximity requirements. Assurance techniques shouldbe used when the assessor is in physical proximity to
the system under evaluation. Remote assessment should be
avoided, but if a scenario necessitates this, it should only
conducted with alternative personnel present on-site.
Accessibility limitations. Assessments should considerto what extent claims of assurance can be made and
addressed due to the wide accessibility limitations that re-
strict assurance technique usage (e.g., proprietary, closed
source systems create little opportunities for the use of some
assurance techniques).
Safety requirements. Ensuring that the use of an assur-ance technique does not negatively impact human and
environmental safety should be the primary goal of an as-
sessment.
Impact of the assurance technique. Assurance techniquesshould not impact the core operational goals of the oper-
ator, nor cause faults in live environments.
Value generated by using an assurance technique. A cost-benefit trade-off must be considered in assurance tech-
nique use and its implications for aiding the management of
organisational risk (e.g., considering the extent to which a
system under evaluation represents the wider system due to
the infeasibility of testing many thousands of field sites).
4.2 Assurance Techniques and the ICS SDLC
To illustrate the limitations placed upon assurance technique
usage within ICSs, the application of assurance techniques
defined within this study to three phases of the SDLC is
examined. The phases focus specifically on the role of as-
surance techniques in product assurance within ICS envi-
ronments. Phases were selected based upon pressing sources
of risk identified based on practitioner responses within the
interviews: assurance technique use during product develop-
ment; during procurement; once operational. These phases
are defined below below:
Development During the supplier’s development process,
what assurance techniques can the supplier themselves use
to ensure that a product has been designed in a secure man-
ner? To illustrate the wider range of potential assurance
techniques that can be used in this scenario, the focus is
on applying assurance techniques within the product devel-
opment process itself, rather than the wider organisational
security that supports it. However, in practice, both are nec-
essary to ensure resilient products (e.g., to mitigate against
supply chain threats). The focus of this phase is at the com-
ponent level (although communication capabilities fall under
scope), and the broad process may culminate as a Factory
Acceptance Test (FAT) [16].
Procurement When a product is being procured, what as-
surance techniques can the procuring operator use to gain
assurances of a product’s security? This phase is again fo-
cused on the component-level, and may form part of a pre-
commissioning Site Acceptance Test (SAT) [16].
Operational Once a system is operational, what assurance
techniques can be used in a security assessment? Opera-
tional is split into two parts: First, the assessment of prod-
ucts and the manner in which they are deployed within a
representative testbed setting. This sub-phase considers the
component and architectural levels. Second, a broader re-
view of how assurance techniques can be used within live
environments, while also considering an organisation’s wider
security processes and controls. This sub-phase considers
the component, architectural, and human levels.
The assurance techniques defined within Appendix A were
chosen based upon their relative frequency of use within IT
environments, while trying to establish a consolidated col-
lection that still covers the breadth of security assessment
scenarios. Within the ICS security assessment paradigm,
however, this frequency requires adjustment. Based upon
the interviews, it was determined that two additional as-
surance techniques must be added: radio frequency analysis
and hardware analysis. Both are defined below.
Radio Frequency Analysis - The assessment of the secu-
rity of a communications channel that uses radio frequency
bands as its transport medium. This may be passive (e.g.,
analysing captured traffic to discover modulation techniques)
or active (e.g., replay attacks). This includes standardised
implementations (e.g., 802.11 and 802.15), but also encom-
passes a wide variety of other technologies (e.g., licensed
radio and microwave).
Hardware Analysis - The process of assessing security
through hardware attack vectors, with or without power-
ing the device, and using either passive mechanisms (e.g.,
reading data buses) or active mechanisms (e.g., modifying
or replaying signals).
The application of assurance techniques to phases is de-
scribed in Table 1. The mapping is based on a typical sce-
nario for an ICS operator, and follows the principles of only
mapping what is feasible and of benefit in such a case. Map-
ping uses three labels. ”X” indicates an assurance technique
has widespread application, while ”×” means it is unlikely
for most cases. ”P” indicates a possible application but is
limited by certain factors, which are indicated by one of two
suffixes. ”(I)” when limited by concerns surrounding opera-
tional impact, and ”(C)” when the application is case depen-
dent (e.g., whether the operator has the resources to fund a
testbed, or has bargaining power during procurement).
The mapping aids in illustrating the importance of a robust
product development lifecycle as it at such a stage where
there is greatest opportunity not only for remediating secu-
rity faults, but also conducting in-depth assessments. Once
operational the use of demonstrable assurance techniques,
such as penetration testing, becomes limited and is marred
by the PASIV principles imposed upon the process. Testbed
assessment aids somewhat in addressing this, but as dis-
cussed, representative testbeds are a rarity.
One limitation of such a mapping is that it highlights only
potential uses of assurance techniques, and the need for fur-
ther review with respect to three factors. First, on where
these assurance techniques are used. For example, as shown
in Figure 1, operational sensitivity increases at lower layers
of ICSs, and this mapping does not consider the opportuni-
ties for assessing ICS components that bridge the IT network
boundary. Second, how they are used. The enforcement of
PASIV principles requires assumptions not explicit in the
mapping. A conspicuous example of this is for architec-
ture review. Part of this process requires the mapping of
current assets and communications channels. Active tech-




Review of Documented Policies,
Procedures, and Processes
P(C) × × X
Review of Client-Completed
Self-Assessment Form
P(C) P(C) × X
Threat Assessment × × P(C) X
Architectural Review P(C) × X X
Configuration Review X × X X
Source Code Review X × × ×
Observe P(C) × × X
Interview P(C) P(C) × X
Red Team Exercise × × × P(IC)
Penetration Testing X P(C) X P(IC)
Vulnerability Scan X P(C) X P(IC)
Social Engineering × × × X
Static Analysis X × × ×
Dynamic Analysis X × × ×
Fuzzing X P(C) X P(IC)
Formal Verification X × × ×
Cryptographic Validation X P(C) X P(IC)
Emanation Security Analysis P(C) × × ×
Witnessed Test P(C) P(C) X X
Public Review × × × ×
Radio Frequency Analysis X P(C) X P(IC)
Hardware Analysis X P(C) X P(IC)
Table 1: The Feasibility of Using Assurance Techniques for Three ICS Lifecycle Phases
niques that may be used in IT environments to facilitate
this such as port scanning can not be used. In OT environ-
ments this mapping involves alternative approaches such as
passive traffic analysis, which is supported by other assur-
ance techniques (e.g., physical inspection, which is defined
here as “Observe”). Third, on how effective these assurance
techniques are. Perceptions of effectiveness can be assessed
independently, but effectiveness is also related to the partic-
ular security control being assessed. Establishing this rela-
tionship is also a requirement to understand how particular
assurance techniques might be used to generate demonstra-
ble claims of assurance within schemes.
4.3 Assurance Techniques and the Security
Controls of ISO/IEC 27001:2013
Assurance schemes exist for multiple phases of the SDLC.
However, it is those targeting operational systems that are
the focus of the majority, as it is at such a stage where there
is the greatest demand for evidence that security risk is be-
ing managed, and therefore, it is the operational phase that
will be the continued focus of this paper. In order to make
a claim of assurance, understanding which assurance tech-
niques can be used at this stage needs to be supplemented
by an understanding of which security controls they relate
to, as not all assurance techniques are equal in this regard.
Furthermore, this will aid in the understanding of which as-
surance techniques can potentially provide supplementary
evidence, or act as substitute evidence (e.g., when there is a
restriction on assurance technique use due to PASIV).
Some assurance schemes clearly dictate the assurance tech-
nique to be used to assess the processes and security controls
it mandates. In some assurance schemes, this requirement
is highly specific (e.g., PCI DSS’s security evaluation crite-
ria [11] is a notable example, although of unlikely relevance
to ICS security); in other schemes a general direction to-
wards a particular assurance technique is established (e.g.,
NERC CIP-007-3 R8 for “Cyber Vulnerability Assessment”
[9] which precedent has established as, in large, a vulnerabil-
ity scan). However, there are many other assurance schemes
in which the choice of assurance technique is intentionally
not mandated, unclear, or ambiguous.
A mapping of assurance techniques to the high-level secu-
rity families of ISO/IEC 27001:2013 has been produced. It
is believed that such a mapping will aid in the development
of an holistic compliance evaluation criteria for the security
controls outlined in future assurance schemes. As such, this
mapping may be of potential use to a wide variety of stake-
holders. First, to international bodies developing standards
in this space (e.g., ISO/IEC JTC1/SC27), such as those for
MSS. Second, to private/consortia bodies that contribute to
the development of assurance schemes (e.g., technical bodies
for penetration testing). Third, for clients and third parties
in designing and assessment and audit programmes.
The choice of ISO/IEC 27001:2013 was driven by the find-
ings of industry surveys, along with the experiences of ICS
operator practices by the interviewed practitioners. Indus-
try surveys such as that of ENISA [4] (EU-centric) and
SANS [12] (US-centric) have both highlighted that for stan-
dards where conformity can be assessed (i.e., rather than
guidelines), ISO/IEC 27001 has popularity beyond or on-







































































































































































































































































































X X × × × × X X × × × × × × × × × × X × × ×
A.6 Organisation of
Information Security
A.6.1 Internal Organisation X X X × × × X X × × × × × × × × × × X × × ×
A.6.2 Mobile Devices and
Teleworking
X X X × × × X X X X × X × × × × × × X × X X
A.7 Human Resource
Security
A.7.1 Prior to Employment X X × × × × X X X × × X × × × × × × X × × ×
A.7.2 During Employment X X × × × × X X X X × X × × × × × × X × × ×
A.7.3 Termination and
Change of Employment




X X X X × × X X × × × × × × × × × × X × × ×
A.8.2 Information
Classification
X X X X × × X X X X × X × × × × × × X × × ×




X X X X X × X X X X X X × × × × × × X × X ×
A.9.2 User Access
Management
X X × × × X X X X X × X × × × × × × X × X ×
A.9.3 User Responsibilities X X × × × × X X X X × X × × × × × × X × × ×
A.9.4 System and
Application Access Control
X X × × X X X X X X × X × × × × × × X × X ×
A.10 Cryptography A.10.1 Cryptographic
Controls
X X X × X × X X X X × × × × × × X × X × X X
A.11 Physical and
Environmental Security
A.11.1 Secure Areas X X X X × × X X X X × X × × × × × × X × × ×





X X X X X × X X X X × X × × × × × × X × X ×
A.12.2 Protection from
Malware
X X × × X × X X X X × X × × × × × × X × × ×
A.12.3 Backup X X × × × × X X × × × × × × × × × × X × × ×
A.12.4 Logging and
Monitoring
X X × × X × X X X × × × × × × × × × X × × ×
A.12.5 Control of
Operational Software
X X × × X × X X X X × X × × × × × × X × × ×
A.12.6 Technical
Vulnerability Management
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
A.12.7 Information Systems
Audit Considerations





X X X X X × X X X X X X × × × × X X X × X ×










X X X X X X X X X X X × X X X X X X X X X X




X X X × × × X X × × × × × × × × × × X × × ×
A.15.2 Supplier Service
Delivery Management












X X X × × × X X × × × × × × × × × × X × × ×





X X X × × × X X X X × X × × × × X × X × × ×
A.18.2 Information Security
Reviews
X X × X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Table 2: Assurance Techniques and ISO/IEC 27001:2013 Security Control Families
part with ICS-specific standards such as ISA/IEC 62443
and NERC CIP. For the purposes of this study, NERC CIP
was considered too US-centric, and ISA/IEC 62443, while
considered a future de facto ICS standard, is in its cur-
rent form perceived by practitioners as “drafty” which de-
ters adoption7. ISO/IEC 27001:2013 in contrast, likely owes
its popularity to its maturity and widespread adoption for
IT systems in general, and while some criticisms may be
attributed to its application within ICSs, these have been
diminished to some extent by the development of ISO/IEC
TR 27019:2013. This standard provides guidelines on how
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 should be adapted to suit the require-
ments of ICS environments (specifically those of energy util-
ities). The current popularity of ISO/IEC 27001:2013 was
therefore a key contributor to the choice of assurance scheme
for this mapping; however, two further factors were also con-
sidered: First, ISO/IEC 27001 standards are widely used as
a framework on which to build other standards. This may
be a strict mapping (e.g., as with the CESG Assured Service
Telecoms CAS(T) standard within the UK8), or an informal
or advisory one (e.g., Appendix H of the NIST 800-53 guide-
lines [10] provides a mapping of ISO/IEC 27001 to NIST
800-53, and then from NIST 800-53 to ISO/IEC 15408); Sec-
ond, ISO/IEC 27001:2013 was deemed to be of interest to
the wider cyber-physical system audience, beyond ICS.
Table 2 outlines the mapping between 22 assurance tech-
niques and the 35 ISO/IEC 27001 control families (out-
lined in the standard’s Annex A and in more detail within
ISO/IEC 27002:2013). Observant readers may note that
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 is an assurance scheme for operational
systems, yet the assurance techniques included within Ta-
ble 2 go beyond those outlined as being capable of use for
operational ICS systems in Section 4.2. A design decision
was made to conduct a more expansive analysis, because
while these restrictions may apply for ICSs, they may not
apply for other cyber-physical systems.
Assurance techniques within ISO/IEC 27001 broadly fall
into two categories: First, those used by a client (i.e., the au-
ditee) or procured (i.e., from a third party) which generate
audit evidence. Second, those used by an auditor. In some
cases, assurance techniques may bridge the two categories
(e.g., for internal audits). It is important to clarify for the
reader, that in standards such as ISO/IEC 27001, auditors
are free to use any assurance technique they deem adequate
for assessing an assurance scheme’s requirement, although
exceptions to this occur in other schemes, where particular
requirements mandate certain assurance techniques be used
in their assessments.
The following mapping is not intended to dictate assurance
technique usage in either category. Instead, it is intended to
provide guidelines on the most appropriate assurance tech-
niques for particular security controls, with the intention of
facilitating the design of security evaluation criteria for fu-
ture assurance schemes. To provide a robust framework for
7Certification schemes such as ISASecure (www.isasecure.
org) exist; however, they have so far been limited to prod-




this analysis, a set of principles was defined.
Core Principle: An assurance technique contributes di-
rectly to an audit and is conducted by the auditor, or the
assurance technique is used by the auditee or a third-party
to generate audit evidence. Sub-principles:
1. Where possible, assurance technique usage is prag-
matic (i.e., they provide a valid contribution, or can
be seen to provide one in the design of future assur-
ance schemes, while ignoring “potential” or “abstract”
inclusions).
2. An assurance technique may provide audit evidence
while not being a direct assessment of a security con-
trol. An example is a threat assessment. This may
include the definition of organisational requirements
and identification of assets, which can contribute to
control families such as “A.6.1 Internal Organisation”.
3. Relationships between the assurance techniques of Ap-
pendix A were defined in Such et al. [14]. If an assur-
ance technique is set which has “optional contribut-
ing” assurance techniques, it does not mean they also
must be enabled in this mapping, and vice versa. An
example is penetration testing, where multiple sub-
techniques can contribute, and may or may not be used
depending on the assessor.
4. Assurance techniques are associated with control fam-
ilies, based upon their potential to assess that control
family. A more granular level of effectiveness exists
beyond this; the mapping does not dictate that two
assurance techniques are equally effective for assessing
that control family.
A review of the frequency of assurance techniques within
each security control family was conducted. Figure 6a and
Figure 6b illustrate the results of this review. A clear trend
can be seen in Figure 6b of 5-12 assurance techniques per se-
curity control family. A qualitative review of these assurance
techniques highlighted the dominance of the “big three” au-
dit techniques (Review of Documented Policies, Procedures,
and Processes; Observe; Interview). Their adaptability is
more clearly visualised within Figure 6a. This, however, is
not surprising given that ISO/IEC 27001 is used to enforce
an ISMS, where processes have historically reigned over the
specifics of security controls. Furthermore, the two tech-
niques appearing with equal frequency are closely related
to the audit process. Witnessed tests are widely used for
third party validation within audits, and Reviews of Self-
Assessment Forms are increasingly being used as an audit-
“lite” technique when a full audit is not viable (more widely,
in particular for assurance schemes that provide a form of
entry-level certification such as with Cyber Essentials [15]).
For the security control families where assurance techniques
appear with higher frequency, we begin to see greater use
of assurance techniques where an element of user behaviour
is considered in the security controls contained. For exam-
ple, Social Engineering appears frequently here, along with
meta-techniques that rely on it heavily, such as Red Team











































































































































(b) By Security Control Family
Figure 6: Frequency of Assurance Techniques Within ISO/IEC 27001:2013 Security Control Families
controls are a minority within ISO/IEC 27001:2013. How-
ever, where such security controls exist, there is as would
be expected, a large number of assurance techniques that
could potentially be used in their assessment. In practice,
however, the constraints of real-world environments may re-
strict the use of some of these (e.g., due to the limitations
imposed by PASIV).
5. CONCLUSIONS
This paper establishes assurance techniques as the funda-
mental tool of the security risk management process, and
the mechanism by which assurance is measured. The use of
assurance techniques within the context of ICS environments
was the subsequent focus of the paper. A series of interviews
was conducted with ICS security practitioners which culmi-
nated in three key contributions.
First, the contextualisation of “how” assurance techniques
are used within real-world ICS security assessment includ-
ing the approaches taken by governments and commercial
security assessment providers. Findings of practitioner in-
terviews were used to derive the PASIV principles for the
safe use of assurance techniques within ICS engagements.
Second, an analysis was conducted to determine “when” as-
surance techniques may be used within three phases of the
SDLC. This highlighted the restriction on the types of as-
surance techniques that can be used once a system is op-
erational, and that the greatest opportunity for diversified
approaches to assessing security were found during the devel-
opment process. Such findings have two implications. First,
it establishes the importance of strong security risk manage-
ment to make a business case for security during procure-
ment to encourage vendor improvement. Second, that the
call for greater validation of the efficacy of implemented se-
curity controls is hindered by the operational challenges of
assurance technique use. It does, however, provide a prelim-
inary step in identifying what assurance techniques may ap-
ply within particular assurance schemes for different phases
of the SDLC.
Third, it provides the first step towards overcoming the crit-
icism of many assurance schemes: that there is inadequate
technical validation of the implemented security controls [7].
This paper does this by promoting an holistic approach to
the design of security evaluation criteria, by mapping the 22
assurance techniques outlined here to the 35 security con-
trol families of ISO/IEC 27001:2013. As such, it answers
the question of “where” assurance techniques can generate
evidence of conformity within assurance schemes.
One limitation of this work is that the opportunity to use
an assurance technique says nothing of its effectiveness. The
authors have addressed this within a separate publication
[14] which outlines the findings of a survey of over 100 se-
curity practitioners on their perceptions of the attributes of
the assurance techniques listed within Appendix A. This
work, however, is for IT systems in general, rather than
ICS specifically, and based on this study’s findings of the
challenges of applying assurance techniques in ICS environ-
ments, this will be addressed as future work. Furthermore,
as outlined in Section 2, individual competence has a inte-
gral role in assurance ecosystem, and therefore contributes
to the measure of effectiveness. Future work will also con-
sider assurance techniques that assess the competencies of
individuals for conducting ICS security assessments.
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The following subsections outlines 20 high-level assurance
techniques organised in 5 categories that were defined within
[14]. A further category outlines assurance techniques for
assessing individual competencies, but was omitted here.
A.1 Review
Review of Documented Policies, Procedures, and
Processes - The process of analysing the documented spec-
ifications (e.g., procedures and security properties) and pro-
cesses (e.g., managerial) for a component or system under
assessment.
Review of Client-Completed Self-Assessment Form -
An analysis of a client submitted review of their implemen-
tation of assurance targets as set out within an assurance
scheme. Self-assessment forms typically consist of a multi-
tude of questions that a client must answer is multiple choice
or narrative form.
Threat Assessment - A multi-stage process used to iden-
tify and rank the threats to computer software, a compo-
nent, or IT system. Threat analysis builds upon the analysis
of sub-processes such as asset identification and architectural
reviews against a security policy.
Architectural Review - An analysis of the components
(type, quantity, configuration, etc.) and their relationships
within a piece of software, component, or system to deter-
mine if their implementation meets a desired security policy.
Configuration Review - A review of the way a system or
its software has been configured to see if this leads to known
vulnerabilities. Configuration reviews can be passive (e.g.,
manually checking software versions for known vulnerabili-
ties) or active (e.g., automated build review scanners).
Source Code Review - The examination of source code to
discover faults that were introduced during the software de-
velopment process. Source code reviews are predominantly
manual; however, they may be supplemented with auto-
mated techniques (e.g., using static analysis tools).
A.2 Observe
Observe - The process of watching a live, operational sys-
tem to identify real-world deviations from documented as-
surance targets.
A.3 Interview
Interview - The process of questioning one or more individ-
uals about security-related matters within the organisation
being assessed through any medium (e.g., in person or vir-
tually).
A.4 Test
Red Team Exercise - A simulated attack on a system that
is given more freedom than is available during a penetration
test, in order to more realistically simulate a real-world mali-
cious attacker. This freedom is given in terms of the engage-
ment’s duration (e.g., often months in duration), available
human resources (e.g., large teams built around individu-
als with different specialisms), allowed use of tools (e.g., a
heavy use of social engineering is common), and restriction
of defender knowledge to test their day-to-day responses to
cyber threats.
Penetration Test - A simulated attack on a component
or system using similar techniques to that of a real-world
malicious attacker. A penetration test may build upon a
vulnerability assessment; however, it differs in having an im-
plicit or explicit goal that the assessment attempts to realise
(e.g., compromise sensitive data or obtain a certain level of
network access). Typically this requires vulnerabilities to be
exploited, which would not be undertaken within a vulner-
ability assessment.
Vulnerability Scan - The process of using an automated
scanner on a web application or network to identify vulner-
abilities. Discovered vulnerabilities are not exploited.
Social Engineering - An attempt to manipulate one or
more human users into performing an action that does not
conform to operational procedures. This can be conducted
in a manner that is goal-based (e.g., access data) or audit-
based (e.g., the percentage of a department vulnerable to a
spear phishing attack).
Static Analysis - Without executing computer software,
static analysis attempts to debug and identify potential soft-
ware vulnerabilities through an analysis of its source code.
Static analyses are predominantly automated; however, they
may contain some elements of manual interaction (e.g., in
order to understand the context and implications of the re-
sults). Human-led analyses fall under source code review.
Dynamic Analysis - Once computer software has been ex-
ecuted, this technique attempts to debug and identify poten-
tial software vulnerabilities through active methods (e.g., in-
putting unexpected data through fuzzing) and passive meth-
ods (e.g., memory analysis).
Fuzzing - The process of injecting erroneous and unex-
pected data into an input field in order to trigger faults (e.g.,
crashes and exceptions) that could be leveraged to discover
software vulnerabilities. Fuzzing may be dumb (i.e., ran-
dom) or intelligent (i.e., with a knowledge of the protocol
being tested).
Formal Verification - The use of mathematical techniques
for assessing functional properties of information and com-
munication systems.
Cryptographic Validation - A method used to analyse a
cryptographic algorithm and/or its implementation within
a component or system (e.g., entropy testing).
Emanation Security Analysis - One or more methods
used to assess device emanations (e.g., electromagnetic or
sound emanations) for the unintentional leakage and disclo-
sure of information.
A.5 Independent Validation
Independent validation occurs when a third party is used
to verify the assessment methodology of an assurance tech-
nique, or otherwise validate the results of its assessment of
assurance targets.
Witnessed Test - The use of an independent witness to
provide a second level of verification that the results of an
assurance technique are as described.
Public Review - The process of opening a technology, com-
ponent, or system to wider review by the public. Public
reviews may be of documents (e.g., drafts of future crypto-
graphic algorithms) or live systems (e.g., bug bounties).
B. INTERVIEW STRUCTURE
1. Risk management and standards:
(a) Do OT environments have clear strategies when
it comes to assessing and treating risk relating to
security? Are public methodologies used? Robust
processes?
(b) How does this differ to the IT network?
(c) How is risk assessed at the boundaries between
these two networks (e.g., responsibilities for sys-
tems that lie in other aspects of the network, such
as OT systems in the IT network)?
(d) Is there a clear strategy for linking safety and se-
curity requirements in the OT environment?
(e) Are you seeing standards being used in these envi-
ronments (at both the OT/IT levels)? As cursory
references, guidelines or for certification?
(f) Are ICS operators enforcing security requirements
on their supply chain?
(g) (General then specific) What about in terms of:
(a) contractors working in these environments?; (b)
the products they procure (e.g., ensuring they’ve
had security assessments - basic or with more ad-
vanced schemes such as with the Common Criteria
or ISASecure).
(h) Do operators embed security and safety require-
ments into the full lifecycle of their ICS system?
2. Risk perception:
(a) How do organisational cultures differ between OT
and IT networks when it comes to security?
(b) Challenges created for securing these systems?
(c) Organisational support for security management
(e.g., from board level)?
(d) How is security risk communicated in these organ-
isations?
(e) Is the security community communicating ICS risks
effectively to those that matter (e.g., to those at
board level)? How?
3. Security assessment:
(a) To what extent is the government’s involvement in
ICS assessments? Extent of private sector assess-
ment?
(b) What assurance techniques are involved in the as-
sessment of an OT and IT environment? Reasons
for choices? Holistic or fragmented? Usage consid-
erations? Logical, social (e.g., social engineering),
and physical assessments (e.g., physical pentests)?
(c) In your experience, how well are the boundaries
defined defined between the OT and IT network?
(d) Do you think the current methods of assessment are
enough to prove that controls are robust enough to
mitigate against most cyber threats? Clarify if nec-
essary: lack of evidence of attacks is not evidence
of good security posture.
(e) What metrics are used during assessments?
4. The future of ICS security:
(a) How can the state of ICS security be improved go-
ing forward (e.g., standards, regulations, cultural
shifts)?
